

DRAFT
23 June 1970

MEMORANDUM FOR:

SUBJECT : Changes in the Preparations of
National Intelligence Estimates

1. By his memorandum of 4 May 1970, the Director called for a sharp break from past NIE formats. He asked that a basic section be prepared that was "more specific in detail, more technical in its discussion, and more involved in sorting and evaluating the evidence." To do this, he said, "I feel it essential to assign the preparation and staffⁱⁿ ~~of~~ this part of the estimate to those offices in the Agency which have the daily responsibility for analyzing developments in these fields: namely, OSR in the DDI and OSI and FMSAC in the DDS&T."

2. Under present planning arrangements, seven military estimates are affected by the Director's decision. These are the five Soviet estimates--Soviet Forces for Intercontinental Attack (11-8), Soviet Strategic Defense Forces (11-3), Soviet Forces for Attack in Eurasia (11-14), Soviet Forces for Limited Distant Action (11-10), and Soviet Military Policy (11-4)--and the two Chinese military estimates--Communist China's

General Purpose and Air Defense Forces (13-3) and Communist China's Strategic Weapons Program (13-8).

Any memoranda for holders of the basic estimates would also be prepared under the new arrangement.

3. Because the focus of all these military estimates ultimately comes to rest upon the capabilities of Soviet (and Warsaw Pact) and Chinese forces, the Office of Strategic Research is deeply involved in each of them. In fact, ~~the~~ two ~~two~~
^{of OSR}
~~Divisions~~ the Soviet and East European Forces Division and the Asian Communist Forces Division-- are organized along mission lines ^{just} in the way that ~~the~~ estimates are organized and prepared.

4. By agreement between the DDI and the DDS&T, a single senior person is assigned the responsibility for seeing that the capabilities of OSR, OSI, and FMSAC are brought together in the preparation of the basic section of the estimate. So far we have had experience only with NIE 11-8-70. The pattern seems clear, however. The senior DDI-DDS&T representative will have to spend virtually full-time on the preparation of the basic section for about three months. He will require an experienced but less senior analyst to assist him full-time for about the same period. These, together with their considerable typing

support, are the direct costs to OSR (and, where they provide the senior representative, to OSI and FMSAC) of the new system. There are other, less direct costs implicit in the shift to a more detailed and more technical format; many of these costs would be the same, whether OSR or ONE was preparing the basic estimate draft.

5. By agreement, OSR is providing the senior representative for 11-8-70. OSI will supply the senior representative for 11-3-70. OSR will provide that person for 11-14 and probably for 11-4, 11-10, 13-3, and 13-8 as well. Because of the nature of the intelligence problems in 11-8 and 11-3, the senior DDI-DDS&T representatives for these estimates can come from either the DDI or the DDS&T offices and probably will, over time, rotate between them. The other estimates tend to be more "forces" and less "technical" in their main concerns and the senior representative will probably normally come from OSR.

6. In some respects, the impact of the new arrangement on OSR is reasonably measurable. Let us assume that OSR is responsible for the basic section for 5 of the 7 Soviet and Chinese military estimates. Let us further assume that the senior representative and his assistant

require 5 man-months between them fully to meet their responsibilities. Then the direct cost of the new arrangement (not counting a substantial clerical load) is 25 man-months, or a little over two man-years. There are of course less tangible costs that must be considered. The senior representatives are almost invariably going to be drawn from the supervisory ranks. (OSR does not plan to create an "estimates staff," and believe it would be unwise to do so.) This means in turn that others must shoulder the load within the losing component and the overall productive capacity of that unit is diminished for a period.

7. This change in the approach to preparing the major military estimates is concurrent with the expansion of OSR's involvement in two other significant areas of activity. One is the support to the whole governmental process--here in Washington and, now, in Vienna--concerned with the negotiations with the Soviets on the limitation of strategic arms. The other is the extensive and continuing examinations of US military policy in a variety of contexts.

8. Since the SALT support functions began in mid-1968, the impact has cut across the entire Office, falling with particular weight on the Soviet and East European Forces Division and the Programs Analysis Division.

The work necessarily requires the time of the more senior personnel of the Office. The Director of OSR, for example, has served as the CIA representative on several SALT-related NSSMs, and OSR division and branch chiefs have had to assume major responsibilities for preparation of drafts and for rapid comments on the vast number of papers generated. Moreover, the continuing heavy workload in the OSR front office has required that a senior officer be detailed from his supervisory responsibilities in one of the divisions to serve full-time as Special Assistant for SALT matters. This shift occurred over a year ago and is still in effect.

9. The time devoted by these senior people to SALT matters has increased the burden on their subordinates for the other work of the Office, which has not diminished with the advent of SALT. In short, SALT has caused a chain reaction that is felt throughout OSR and adds to almost everyone's workload, even those not directly involved with it.

10. Since the present Administration began, it has undertaken several comprehensive, interagency studies of one aspect or another of US defense policy. These have usually been in response to National Security Study Memoranda issued by Dr. Kissinger. These have recently been joined by studies undertaken under the aegis of the Defense Policy Review Committee, chaired by Dr. Kissinger and including the Director of Central Intelligence as one of its members. OSR is right now directly engaged in NSSM-69 (US Nuclear Policy in Asia), NSSM 84 (US Strategies and Forces for NATO), NSSM 93 (The Arab-Israeli Military Balance), and NSSM 92 (Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions between NATO and the Warsaw Pact). The last--NSSM 92--is an exceptionally comprehensive undertaking in the fashion of the preparations leading to the first SALT talks and is being directed by the Verification Group mechanism in the NSC staff. In addition, the DPRC has set in train a study of the US strategic posture by an interagency working group under DOD chairmanship.

11. These interagency studies have a number of common characteristics of relevance to this memorandum. First, by virtue of the Director's position, CIA is the spokesman for and conduit to the entire intelligence community in the preparation of the studies. Second,

most of the material required for them must be specially prepared; only rarely can intelligence analysis and judgments already in being be incorporated as is. Third, each study spawns several sub-working groups, each producing papers requiring inputs, review, and meetings. The net result, from the standpoint of OSR, has been a significant increase in the workload of the Office. Given the style of this Administration, there appears little likelihood that this kind of activity will decrease in the foreseeable future.